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Some prominent epistemologists make a distinction between evidence on 
the one hand and what is made o f  that evidence by a subject on the other. 
For reasons that will become clear, this view threatens the evidentialist 
project. Yet, as I will argue, it is possible to retain evidentialism while 
preserving the intuition behind this distinction. First, I will explain this 
distinction and illustrate it with two examples. Second, I will explain what 
is at stake for evidentialism. Third, I will develop a possible solution to 
the problem. I close by considering some likely objections to this solution.
Close to a Truism
Jonathan Kvanvig is among those who appear to see a distinction between 
evidence and what is made o f that evidence. In fact, Kvanvig writes, “it 
is something close to a truism that there is both the evidence and what 
we make o f it” (Kvanvig, 2011, p. 53). And Kvanvig is not alone in this. 
Many Bayesians implicitly affirm this distinction when they distinguish 
between conditional probabilities on observations and unconditional prob­
abilities o f  observations.
To illustrate the view of evidence I believe Kvanvig and others have in 
mind, consider my friend Kraig, a former basketball coach turned philoso­
pher. Recently Kraig and I attended a college basketball game together. 
According to the Kvanvigian construal o f evidence, though we may hold 
different beliefs Kraig and I largely have the same evidence o f what hap­
pened during the basketball game. We sat only one seat apart, and we 
both have good vision. Thus our visual perspective differed only very 
slightly. Given that I know very little about basketball relative to Kraig, 
it is unsurprising on the Kvanvigian model to find that Kraig came away 
with a much greater understanding o f that game than I. Our evidence set 
consisted o f nearly identical visual facts; but, given his superior knowl­
edge o f the sport and o f its individual participants, Kraig took our shared 
evidence and arranged it into a much more sophisticated understanding 
o f the game. In short, Kraig had the ability to make more o f the evidence 
which was available to us both.
Similarly, say two equally well-informed and well-talented arborists, 
Amy and Adam, are walking through a forest unfamiliar to either o f them. 
Though the same sensory evidence—visual, olfactory, etc.— is available
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to both, Amy and Adam disagree over the proper classification o f a tree 
species they have both just encountered for the first time. Again, we see 
that in this common construal o f evidence the same evidence is shared by 
both Amy and Adam, and yet they use their individual knowledge and skill 
(each o f which is comparable to the other’s knowledge and skill) to form 
the common evidence into support for incompatible propositions.1
The Problem for Evidentialism
As indicated earlier, lurking behind this seemingly innocuous distinction 
between evidence and what we make o f it is a potential problem for evi­
dentialism. Here is how Kvanvig frames it:
... it is something close to a truism that there is both the ev­
idence and what we make of it. To the extent that what we 
make of the evidence we have is a function of a perspective 
with healthy doses of reflective ascent, to that extent there is 
pressure to think of rationality not solely in terms of one’s to­
tal body of evidence regarding a target proposition, but also in 
terms that are less sanguine to the claims of evidentialism. To 
say that rationality is a function o f one’s evidence and what one 
makes o f it is, in this way, to say something that goes beyond 
evidentialism itself (Kvanvig, 2011, p. 53; [emphasis added])
Recall that at the heart o f evidentialism lies the following thesis:
(EJ) Doxastic attitude D  toward proposition p  is epis- 
temically justified for S at t if  and only if  having 
D  toward p  fits the evidence S  has at t. (Feldman 
and Conee, 2004, p . 83)
In other words, epistemic justification is entirely a matter o f evidence. Or 
as Conee and Feldman prefer to put it, epistemic justification “strongly 
supervenes” on the evidence one has at a given time (Feldman and Conee, 
2004, p. 101). Or if  one prefers deontological language, what one epis- 
temically ought to believe is solely determined on the basis o f one’s evi- 
dence.2
We are now in a position to see the problem: Kvanvig’s distinction 
between evidence and what we make o f it is problematic for evidentialism 
because, contrary to Conee and Feldman’s (EJ) thesis, what one epistemi- 
cally ought to believe at a given time is determined not solely by one’s evi­
dence but rather by both the evidence and a host of other, perspectival fac-
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tors which influence what we make o f the evidence. To illustrate, consider 
the example o f the basketball game given earlier. Kraig has much more 
knowledge o f the game o f basketball than I ever will. And, on the Kvanvi- 
gian model, Kraig and I have roughly the same evidence. So, by (EJ), our 
doxastic attitude toward the proposition that it was a good game— assum­
ing we have a univocal concept o f a ‘good game’ in mind— should be the 
same or roughly the same. Otherwise one o f us is epistemically unjusti­
fied in our doxastic attitude toward this proposition. It is hard to see how 
evidentialism can be correct, then, when there are so many perspectival 
factors, none o f them necessarily irrational, which affect how I shape our 
common evidence into my affirmation that it was a good game. Does the 
evidentialist really want to claim that Kraig and I should have the same 
doxastic attitude given the numerous ways in which we are likely to dif- 
fer—say in personality, disposition, and self-trust—which will affect what 
we make o f our common evidence?
Note that this applies to peer disagreement as well.3 Kvanvig suggests 
that it is perfectly rational for perspectival factors like self-trust— in ad­
dition to one’s evidence—to shape or affect one’s doxastic attitude, even 
when a peer disagrees.4 The same evidence was available to both Amy 
and Adam, the arborists. But, for Kvanvig, it may be perfectly rational, or 
epistemically justified, for these peers to adopt different doxastic attitudes, 
because what is epistemically justified involves not only their evidence but 
also other (not necessarily irrational) factors which shape what Amy and 
Adam make o f the evidence. So here we have a fairly straight-forward 
denial o f the evidentialist thesis (EJ), motivated by the acceptance o f the 
distinction between evidence and what we make o f it.
At this stage, some evidentialists are likely to have the following reac­
tion: Surely there is no problem here. All that is required to account for 
rational disagreement between people with the same immediate evidence 
is that the two subjects have different prior probability distributions. After 
all, what matters here is not immediate evidence but total evidence.
This response, while understandable, is nonetheless mistaken. It is 
true that what matters according to evidentialists is total evidence, includ­
ing background knowledge. However, notice that background knowledge 
is not all that is at work: one’s personality, disposition, and level o f self­
trust rightly affect one’s doxastic attitudes. Consider again our arborists, 
Amy and Adam. It seems perfectly possible for Amy to find different parts 
o f their shared evidence more salient than others (with regard to tree classi­
fication) without any background belief about the salience o f the evidence 
and without necessarily being irrational. While they both make all of the 
same sensory observations (i.e., have the same sensory evidence), Amy’s
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eye is caught by the beauty o f the leaves; they just strike her in a way they 
don’t strike Adam and in a way that they might not strike her on another 
occasion. Because of this, she focuses in on the leaf shape evidence as 
most salient and decides the new tree’s proper classification accordingly. 
Something about the unique seed structure, however, gets Adam thinking 
in a direction different from Amy (even though Amy is aware o f the seed 
structure and Adam is aware o f the leaf shape). Based on the seed struc­
ture o f the new tree he classifies it slightly differently. He accords the data 
from leaf shape some weight but not as much as Amy (and vice versa). To 
make things more precise, let’s stipulate that Amy believes to degree .55 
that it is species x  and to degree .45 that it is species y. Adam believes 
it is species x  with .45 confidence and species y  to degree .55. Plausibly, 
there is nothing irrational here. Hence, because it still seems possible for 
two people with the same immediate evidence and the same (relevant) 
background knowledge to reasonably differ in their doxastic attitudes (or 
at least in their degrees o f belief), evidentialism appears false.
Or perhaps better still, say that Amy and Adam have all the same back­
ground knowledge when they gaze upon the new tree in the forest and 
even find each item o f evidence salient to the same degree. Say, for in­
stance, that both o f them have seen in textbooks many times a picture o f a 
similar tree. Let us even stipulate that Amy and Adam have the same vi­
sual images (for all practical purposes) before their minds when they recall 
the similar-looking tree in the textbook. On the day they discover the new 
tree Amy is especially confident in her memorial abilities (though not in a 
reflective way). Comparing the tree before her to the image in her mind, 
Amy decides that this is definitely a relative o f the tree in the textbook and 
classifies the new species accordingly. Adam, however, while having the 
same background evidence (including the same textbook image before his 
mind, with the same vividness) is not so confident in his memory.5 Adam 
lacks Amy’s level o f confidence that this new tree is in fact similar to 
the one in the textbook, even though he is slightly inclined toward Amy’s 
conclusion more than not. Hence he withholds on whether or not this new 
species is related to the textbook variety and remains non-committal about 
the best classification for the new tree. To most o f us, I suspect, neither 
Amy nor Adam seem particularly unreasonable.6 Importantly, Amy and 
Adam do not differ in their prior probabilities on any botanical or memo­
rial facts. Nor do they differ with regard to what they find salient. What 
separates them here is merely their level o f confidence in their own abili­
ties.
Still, this may not be enough to mollify our objector. Perhaps one’s 
level o f self-trust is simply part o f one’s background evidence. This sug­
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gestion has some plausibility in that it is possible for these perspectival 
factors to become the subject o f conscious reflection. For example, in 
the scenario above, Adam could become aware o f the fact that he is not 
feeling confident and for this reason withhold on the belief in question. 
In fact, he might become consciously aware o f his current lack o f confi­
dence, o f his past track record in such matters, and even his disposition to 
self-doubt in such circumstances. For such a person, perspectival factors 
would constitute part o f their evidence. But a little reflection indicates 
that this would constitute an atypical case. It would take an extremely 
over-bearing parent, intensive therapy, or serious philosophical training to 
make the average person aware o f these perspectival factors from moment 
to moment. Perspectival factors o f  which we are usually unaware affect 
what is rational to believe. Hence, on the Kvanvigian view o f evidence— 
contra standard evidentialism— an extra-evidential factor seems to affect 
what is rational to believe.
A Possible Solution
So far I have presented two ideas. First, the seemingly common sense 
difference between evidence and what we make o f it; and second, Kvan- 
vig’s plausible contention that this distinction creates at least a prima facie  
problem for evidentialism. Given these two ideas, is there any way out for 
those o f us who find evidentialism the most plausible account o f epistemic 
justification? Can both this common sense distinction and evidentialism 
be preserved? Sadly, I believe the answer is no. Kvanvig has made a com­
pelling case. However, I believe evidentialism and the intuition behind 
Kvanvig’s distinction can be harmonized so as to preserve the plausibility 
o f evidentialism.
I would like to suggest that Kvanvig’s common sense distinction can 
be reinterpreted in the following evidentialist-friendly way. This distinc­
tion rests on a faulty notion o f what evidence is in the first place. Does 
evidence exist in the form o f objects or events which are ‘out there’ in the 
world? This is certainly not the notion o f evidence preferred by several 
paradigmatic defenders of evidentialism. Conee and Feldman advance the 
following supervenience thesis (S): (S)
(S) The justificatory status of a person’s doxastic atti­
tudes strongly supervenes on the person’s occur- 
rent and dispositional mental states, events, and 
conditions. (Conee and Feldman, 2004, p. 56)
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Conee and Feldman, then, prefer an internalist understanding o f evidence. 
Evidence consists only o f mental states (broadly construed). It does not 
consist merely in what is out there to be perceived but in one’s perceptions. 
After all, perceptions are all we have to go on when forming doxastic at­
titudes. As Michael Huemer puts it, “All o f your beliefs are inevitably 
based upon your own mental states...” (Huemer, 2011, p. 28). Indeed, 
what else could one’s beliefs be based upon? As much as we would wish 
otherwise, we do not have access to raw (i.e., unperceived) data. We have, 
for better or worse, our own “mental states, events, and conditions.”7
Given this internalist notion o f evidence, does it really make sense 
to speak o f evidence and what we make o f the evidence? I don’t think 
so. The distinction collapses once we regard mental states as evidence. 
Conee and Feldman draw the following mentalist implication (M) from 
thesis (S):
(M) If any two possible individuals are exactly alike 
mentally, then they are alike justificationally, e.g., 
the same beliefs are justified for them to the same 
extent. (Conee and Feldman, 2004, p. 56)
So we see that the implication o f (S) is that justification supervenes on 
mental states just as it does on evidence. After all, mental states are our 
evidence.
Now, given mentalism, must the evidentialist maintain that Kvanvig’s 
distinction is completely mistaken? If so, that seems a bad outcome. For 
the distinction does seem, as I ’ve said, commonsensical. Fortunately, the 
mentalist evidentialist need not think Kvanvig too far off the mark. There 
is still a great role that each one o f us, along with our background beliefs, 
play in shaping or arranging data coming at us from the external world. 
Yet, I ’d like to suggest that this role is pre-evidential—it comes before the 
mental states which constitute one’s evidence. Background beliefs, for 
instance, are not merely static evidence but also shape further evidence for 
a subject S  by affecting which mental states S  has.
Here’s how it might look. Kraig and I attend a basketball game and 
have very similar visual fields. But Kraig, due to his superior knowl­
edge o f basketball, actually has different mental states than I do during the 
game. Given his background beliefs Kraig will amass all sorts o f evidence 
(in the form o f mental states) which I will not because o f his conceptual 
framework and prior experiences. The content o f his seemings may dif­
fer significantly from mine. Say, for instance, the Michigan Wolverines’
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point guard motions to set up their S-5 play involving a curl screen. They 
subsequently run the S-5, and their point guard scores a layup. What will 
Kraig’s evidence—in the form o f a mental state or ‘seeming state’—be? It 
will seem to Kraig as though the Wolverines ran a successful curl screen. 
W hat will my seeming state be? It will seem to me as though the point 
guard put his hand in the air, and there followed a great deal o f movement 
on the floor before the point guard eventually scored a layup.8 Our back­
ground beliefs have affected not merely what Kraig and I have done with 
the raw visual evidence; rather, given our background beliefs, we simply 
have different evidence in the form o f different seeming states. It seems 
to Kraig as though a successful curl screen has been run. I do not share 
that seeming in the slightest. In addition to set plays, Kraig will also grasp 
causal connections, like why a player was substituted, whereas I will only 
see that a player was substituted. Or again, it will seem to Kraig that a set 
play has been botched though the Wolverines score whereas it will only 
seem to me that the Wolverines have scored.
At this point another objection is likely to arise, or rather, the same 
objection arises again with more conviction: Can’t this all be explained by 
different background evidence rather than different mental states? Kraig 
is simply able to know that a curl screen was run given his current visual 
evidence and his prior knowledge o f what a curl screen looks like. I f  this 
is correct, why posit different mental states?
But let’s say for the sake o f example that Kraig is daydreaming when 
the curl screen is run. He sees (roughly) the same visual image that I do, 
but on this occasion he fails to bring it under the concept o f ‘curl screen’ 
that he has in his background knowledge. Is Kraig at that moment justified 
in believing that a curl screen was run during the game? Here it is helpful 
to distinguish two kinds o f justification. Epistemologists often distinguish 
propositional from doxastic justification. If  one has propositional justifi­
cation for p, then one has good, supporting reasons to believe that p — re­
gardless o f whether one actually believes that p. Doxastic justification 
for p , by contrast, demands that one not merely possess good, supporting 
reasons for believing p  but also that one actually base her belief that p  on 
those supporting reasons. Returning to daydreaming Kraig, it is arguable 
that he is propositionally justified (i.e., that he possesses good reasons for 
the belief that ‘a curl screen was run during the game’). But surely he is 
not doxastically justified in believing a curl screen was run. After all, he is 
not at all aware that it was run. If, after the game, Kraig runs into a fellow 
basketball enthusiast who asks whether the Wolverines ran a curl screen, 
would he be justified in believing that one was run? Again, it would seem 
not—not, at any rate, unless Kraig recalls that visual image from memory
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and is then in the mental state of it seeming to him that a curl screen was 
run. In other words, the mere visual perception and background knowl­
edge alone are not enough for doxastic justification here. Something else 
is needed. That something is a mental or seeming state with the content 
o f a curl screen.
Now, how exactly does the fact that Kraig and I have different mental 
states solve the problem posed to evidentialism by Kvanvig’s distinction 
between evidence and what we make of it? In short, the solution is to rec­
ognize that even when it appears that two people have similar evidence for 
a given proposition p, they often do not, for, they may have very different 
evidence in the form of different seemings. If  mental states are evidence, 
then my evidence itself is different than Kraig’s, even though in some im­
portant sense we shared the same visual field.
This applies equally well (mutatis mutandis) to our case of arborist 
peer-disagreement. Background beliefs are not the only factor leading 
to disparate mental states. While background beliefs are among the most 
important o f factors, surely differences in mood, personality, and other 
factors also shape one’s mental states. So, it is true that there is a common 
starting place (here, Amy and Adam’s visual field). It is also true that there 
is a sense in which the arborists have ‘affected’ or ‘made something o f’ the 
raw data; they bring something to the table which accounts for why they 
perceive the data differently. But it is crucially important to note that they 
‘affect’ the data pre-evidentially (i.e., before their conscious seemings) by 
bringing their mood, personality, and level o f self-trust to the perception 
o f the data in the first place. This is not typically an active or inferential 
‘shaping’ or ‘making o f’ the evidence but a passive and unconscious one. 
In sum, despite their peerhood and similar visual images, the evidence 
possessed by Amy and Adam differs because their mental states differ.
Two Objections
It is still open to the advocate o f the evidence and what we make o f it dis­
tinction to object along the following lines. If  two subjects have the same 
evidence only when they share the same mental state, do they ever have 
the same evidence? Do two people ever truly share the exact same mental 
state? If not, evidentialism seems to amount to the following trivial thesis: 
I f  two subjects were to share the exact same mental states—which they 
never will—they would share the same doxastic justification regarding the 
same propositions.
While this might at first appear to pose a serious problem for eviden­
tialism, the problem is only apparent. Evidentialism can avoid the trivi­
ality concern by noting that the more similar two subjects’ mental states
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are, the more similar their doxastic justification regarding any proposition 
will be. Evidentialism could thus be falsified if  we were to discover a 
case where two subjects shared similar mental states but were justified in 
adopting radically different doxastic attitudes toward a proposition p. In 
this way evidentialism remains quite substantive.
Others might fear that my solution lends itself to an unacceptable Hu­
mean skepticism. Given my solution, does one ever have access to the 
‘real world,’ or only one’s own mental states? If  the latter, debilitating 
skepticism might result. Fortunately, one can accept my proposed solu­
tion and even hold to a direct realism which claims that “in cases of nor­
mal perception, we are directly aware o f something in the external world” 
(Huemer, 2000, p. 575). True, as Huemer notes, “we cannot perceive 
o f external objects without having perceptual experiences that represent 
them.” But it is a mistake to conclude, as some do,
that we are not really, or not directly, perceiving external ob­
jects at all, but only our representations. In fact, perceptual 
experiences are the “tool” with which we perceive external ob­
jects. Their existence no more precludes us from perceiving 
those objects than the use of an axe precludes the woodcutter 
from chopping his wood. And just as it would be a mistake 
to conclude that the man is really chopping his axe, so it is a 
mistake to conclude that we are really perceiving (or otherwise 
enjoying awareness of) our perceptual experiences. We per­
ceive external objects by having perceptual experiences—in the 
sense that those experiences partly constitute our perceiving of 
external objects.... (Huemer, 2001, p. 81)
In sum, when I claim that evidence consists in mental states, this in no way 
implies that we cannot be directly aware o f objects in the external world. 
The direct realist can claim that she is directly aware o f physical objects9 
and that (non-inferential) evidence for those objects exists in the form of 
mental states. The claim that one can be directly aware o f a blue light, for 
example, in no way negates the claim that the evidence for there being a 
blue light is that one seems to see a blue light.
Conclusion
If my argument has been successful then I have shown that while Kvan- 
vig’s distinction between evidence and what is made o f that evidence is 
ultimately mistaken, the mentalist evidentialist can retain the grain o f truth 
in this distinction. The mentalist evidentialist sees mental states them­
selves as evidence and can account for cases o f disagreement over, say, 
the same visual field in terms o f different mental states (i.e., different
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evidence) rather than different arrangement o f shared evidence. Typical 
evidentialists, then, have internalist (mentalist) resources to deal satisfac­
torily with the challenge posed by the distinction between evidence and 
what we make o f it.10
Notes
1 See the following section for more on how this process is supposed to 
work.
2 It is worth noting that the privileging of the standard sense of “epistemic 
ought”—see Feldman (2004)—has been challenged by Keith DeRose (2000; 
2011). Still, in what follows I retain the standard sense.
3 There are at least two distinct problems of peer disagreement. One con­
cerns how it is possible (if it is indeed possible) for peers with the same (or nearly 
the same) evidence regarding proposition p  to reasonably diverge in their doxastic 
attitudes toward p. Another problem concerns whether and to what extent they 
should revise their doxastic attitudes (or perhaps their degrees of belief) upon 
learning of the evidence, credentials, and doxastic attitudes of the other party or 
parties. In what follows, I am only concerned with the former problem.
4 Kvanvig believes that self-trust and such factors are best modeled as meta­
evidence.
5 I’m assuming here that Adam is not obsessive in this regard, in which case 
we might be tempted to think that this perspectival factor is irrational.
6 I am assuming throughout that, while Amy and Adam come to different 
conclusions, they have not (yet) discussed their differing conclusions. For once 
they do, there may be some pressure for both of them—knowing, as they do, the 
equal expertise of the other—to be much less confident in their judgments or even 
suspend judgment altogether. See footnote 3.
7 For the latest debates over this conception of evidence as mental ‘seem- 
ings’ see Tucker (2013).
8 In all seriousness, thanks to Kraig Martin for giving me the example of a 
curl screen. I have no idea what that is.
9 Awareness, as Huemer (2001, p. 51) points out, is awareness o f  some­
thing—in this case the external world.
10 I’d like to thank two anonymous reviewers, Trent Dougherty, Lydia Mc- 
Grew, the Baylor Graduate Philosophy Colloquium, and attendees of the Univer­
sity of Miami’s 2011 Graduate Epistemology Conference for helpful feedback.
Works Cited
Conee, Earl and Richard Feldman. (2004) Internalism Defended. In Earl Conee
and Richard Feldman (eds.), Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology (pp. 53­
82). New York: Oxford University Press.
DeRose, Keith. (2000) Ought We to Follow Our Evidence? Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 60(33): 697-706.
98
Evidence and What We Make o f It
---------. (2011) Questioning Evidentialism. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidential-
ism and its Discontents (pp. 137-146). New York: Oxford University Press.
Feldman, Richard. (2004) The Ethics of Belief. In Earl Conee and Richard Feld­
man (eds.), Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology (pp. 166-195). New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Feldman, Richard and Earl Conee. (2004) Evidentialism. In Earl Conee and 
Richard Feldman (eds.), Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology (pp. 83-107). 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Huemer, Michael. (2000) Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument. Phi­
losophy and Phenomenological Research 61(2): 397-413.
---------. (2001) Skepticism and the Veil o f Perception. Lanham, MD: Rowman
& Littlefield.
---------. (2011) Epistemological Egoism and Agent-Centered Norms. In Trent
Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents (pp. 17-33). New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Kvanvig, Jonathan. (2011) The Rational Significance of Reflective Ascent. In 
Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents (pp. 34-54). New 
York: Oxford University Press.
Tucker, Chris, ed. (2013) Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism 
and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press.
99
